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authority which acts to 'restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.'

30 1

302
Town of Huntington v. Pierce Arrow Realty Corp.

(decided June 5, 1995)

Plaintiff, Town of Huntington, sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendants from continuing the operation of an

"adult entertainment cabaret" 3 0 3 within defendants' restaurant
and bar establishment. 3 0 4 Plaintiff alleged that the defendants

were in violation of a town zoning ordinance designed to restrict
'3 0 5 to
the location of premises which contain an "adult use"

designated areas within the Town of Huntington. 306 The Supreme
Court, Suffolk County, granted the preliminary injunction
pending a determination of plaintiff's action for a permanent
injunction. 30 7 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
301. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529 n.3, 523
N.E.2d 277, 281 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 n.3 (1988).
302. 627 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
303. See TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-71[D][2] (1978). This section
defines an "adult entertainment cabaret" as "[a] public or private establishment
which present[s] topless dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators or
exotic dancers or other similar entertainments and which establishment is
customarily not open to the public generally but excludes any minor by reason
of age." Id.
304. Pierce Arrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
305. See TOWN of HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-71[D][2] (1978). The
following excerpt sets forth the relevant provisions of the Code which define
the term "adult use":
(a) The appearance of any person on commercial premises for the
purposes of financial consideration in such a manner or attire
as to expose to view any portion of the pubic area, buttocks,
vulva, genitals or breast below the top of the areola, or any
simulation thereof.
(b) The appearance of any person on such premises in attire
generally considered to be garments worn underneath normal
streetwear for purient or commercial purposes.
Id.
306. PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
307. Id.
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reversed the order granting the preliminary injunction, holding
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the ordinance
in question was enacted in conformance with freedom of speech
requirements under both the Federal 308 and New York State3 09
Constitutions. 3 10 Therefore, the court found the preliminary
injunction order improper since the plaintiff, the Town of

Huntington, failed to meet its burden of establishing the
3 11
likelihood of their ultimate success on the merits.

308. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." Id.
309. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. This section emphatically commands that:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
310. PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
311. Id. The court noted in its opinion that the Town of Huntington could
seek preliminary injunctive relief without establishing special damages or
injury to the public or the nonexistence of an adequate remedy. See N.Y.
TowN LAw § 268 (McKinney 1987). This section states in relevant part:
1. The town board may provide by ordinance for the enforcement of this
article and of any ordinance or regulation made thereunder. A violation
of this article or of such ordinance or regulation is hereby declared to be
an offense.., for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon courts
and judicial officers generally, violations of this article or of such
ordinance or regulation shall be deemed misdemeanors and for such
purpose only all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors shall apply
to such violations ....
2. In case any building or structure is... maintained, or any building,

structure, or land is used... in violation of this article or of any
ordinance or other regulation made under authority conferred thereby,
the proper local authorities of the town, in addition to other remedies,
may institute any appropriate action or proceedings to prevent such
unlawful... maintenance, use or division of land, to restrain, correct
or abate such violation, to prevent the occupancy of said building,
structure, or land or to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business or use
in or about such premises ....
Id. See, e.g., Town of East Hampton v. Buffa, 157 A.D.2d 714, 715, 549
N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (2d Dep't 1990) (citing Town of Islip v. Clark, 90 A.D.2d
500, 501, 454 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (2d Dep't 1982)). Furthermore, the Third
Department, in Town of Esopus v. Fausto Simoes & Assocs., held that "while
it is not necessary by virtue of Town Law § 268 that plaintiff show irreparable
harm as a condition of obtaining injunctive relief, whether immediate relief of
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The court specifically found that the Town of Huntington failed
to establish whether the "adult use" ordinance provided
reasonable alternative locations at which the owners could
operate their cabaret. 3 12 Furthermore, the court also found an
absence of evidence showing that the ordinance was reasonably
limited to establishments which were found to have secondary
detrimental effects on the surrounding community. 3 13
The defendants, Pierce Arrow Realty Corporation, have
operated their restaurant and bar since 1981 as an adult
entertainment cabaret. 3 14 Subsequent to the establishment of
defendants' business, the Town of Huntington, enacted the
zoning ordinance in question on January 22, 1991. The ordinance
sought to restrict and limit the location of "adult use" premises,
such as the defendants' restaurant and bar, to certain areas within
the town of Huntington. 3 15 The defendants herein challenged the
constitutional validity of such a zoning ordinance under both the
First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article 1,
section 8 of the New York State Constitution. 3 16
In overturning the grant of the preliminary injunction, the
Second Department found

"the record ... devoid of any

evidence that would tend to establish that the ordinance in
question was enacted in conformance with various requirements
of the Federal and State Constitutions." 3 17 In reaching its
conclusion, the Second Department applied federal law, relying
this nature should be extended is still a matter governed by equitable
principles." 145 A.D.2d 840, 841-42, 535 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (1988).
312. PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
313. Id. In addition, the court held further that the Town of Huntington did

not proffer any evidence in their application for injunctive relief as to whether
the owners of the cabaret were entitled to a reasonable "amortization period."

Id. See Village of Valatie v. Smith, 83 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 632 N.E.2d 1264,
1266, 610 N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1994) (defining reasonable amortization period

as "a period of time granted to owners of nonconforming uses during which
they may phase out their operations as they see fit and make other
arrangements").
314.
315.
316.
317.

PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id.
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upon several United States Supreme Court cases and only one
New York case, all of which dealt with ordinances or regulations
impinging upon freedom of speech or expression in the
3 18
commercial arena.
For example, the court relied on Schad v. Mount Ephraim,3 19

where the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance which
banned all live entertainment in a commercial zone. The Court
held that "[b]y excluding live entertainment throughout the
Borough, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibit[ed] a wide
range of expression that has long been held to be within the
protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments" and,
therefore, was overbroad and not a valid content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction. 3 20 In City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc. 3 2 1 the United States Supreme Court enunciated the
318. Id. See, e.g., Paris Adult Bookstore I v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215
(1990); City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Schad
v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 141
A.D.2d 148, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1988), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d
215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989).
319. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Schad, the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning
ordinance which sought to ban all live entertainment in a commercial zone
under the First Amendment. Id. at 65. The appellants, who operated an adult
bookstore, introduced a coin-operated mechanism in the bookstore which
permitted customers to watch a nude live dancer performing behind a glass
partition. Id. at 62. The Court reasoned that the "First Amendment requires
that there be sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of
protected expression as one of the permitted commercial uses in the Borough"
which does not "appear on the face of the ordinance since the ordinance itself
is ambiguous with respect to whether live entertainment is permitted." Id. at
67. Therefore, under a time, place, and manner restriction analysis, the Court
determined that the ordinance in question was not "narrowly drawn to respond
to what might be the distinctive problems arising from certain types of live
entertainment;" nor did the ordinance leave open "adequate alternative
channels of communication." Id. at 74, 76.
320. Id. at 65.
321. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The respondents operated two movie theaters in
the City of Renton which showed adult films, thus categorizing the theater as
an "adult motion picture theater." Id. at 44. Under the city's zoning ordinance,
an "adult motion picture theater" was defined as "lain enclosed building used
for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any
other such visual media, distinguished or characteri[zed] by an emphasis on
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applicable test for reasonable content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions on commercial speech 322 which has been
followed under the Federal Constitution as in Paris Adult
Bookstore II v. City of Dallas3 2 3 and the New York State
matter depicting, describing or relating to 'specified sexual activities' or
'specified anatomical areas'. . . for observation by patrons therein." Id. at 44
(citations omitted). The ordinance in question prohibited these "adult motion
picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, singleor multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any
school." Id. at 44. The respondents challenged the ordinance on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Id. at 45. However, the Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance as a reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction which was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
without unreasonably limiting alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 5455. The Court summarily held that
[TJhe Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the
'admittedly serious problems' created by adult theaters. Renton has not
used 'the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression,' but
rather has sought to make some areas available for adult theaters and
their patrons, while at the same time preserving the quality of life in the
community at large by preventing those theaters from locating in other
areas. This, after all, is the essence of zoning. Here... the city has
enacted a zoning ordinance that meets these goals while also satisfying
the dictates of the First Amendment.
Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
322. Regulations which are deemed reasonable content-neutral time, place,
and manner restrictions on commercial speech are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, relating only to the time, place, and
manner of expression, and "are valid if the governmental interest to be
achieved outweighs the resulting interference with free expression." Caviglia,
73 N.Y.2d at 556-57, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145. See also City
of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
323. 493 U.S. 215 (1990). The defendants challenged, on First Amendment
grounds, a city ordinance which sought to impose certain regulations on
"sexually oriented businesses" as defined in the ordinance as "an adult arcade,
adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion
picture theater, adult theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual
encounter center." d. at 220 (citations omitted). The City of Dallas enacted
the ordinance to regulate sexually oriented businesses through "a scheme
incorporating zoning, licensing, and inspections" aimed at "eradicating the
secondary effects of crime and urban blight." Id. at 220-21. In viewing the
ordinance as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction under City
of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
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Constitution as in Town of Islip v. Caviglia.324 In Pierce Arrow
Realty, since the Town of Huntington failed to establish such
elements, the court denied the Town's request for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the defendants from operating their restaurant
and bar as an adult entertainment cabaret. 325
decision upholding that portion of the ordinance relating to zoning on the
ground that it was "'designed to serve a substantial governmental interest' and
allowed for 'reasonable alternative avenues of communication." Id. at 222
(citation omitted).
324. 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989). The
petitioner, Town of Islip, enacted a zoning ordinance which differentiated
between certain "adult uses" and limited operation of these adult uses to areas
zoned Industrial I. Id. at 548, 540 N.E.2d at 216, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
Respondent, Caviglia, owned and operated the Happy Hour Bookstore outside
the zone of Industrial I in the heart of the downtown district of the Village of
Bay Shore. Id. at 550, 540 N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141. This
bookstore excluded minors by reason of age and therefore fell within the
definition of "adult use" under the ordinance. Id. The respondents challenged
the ordinance on First Amendment grounds as violating their constitutional
right to freedom of expression. Id. In upholding the constitutional validity of
the zoning ordinance, the court recognized that "[b]ecause zoning ordinances
are legislative acts they enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality and if
there is a reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved and the
means adopted to achieve it the regulation will be upheld." Id. at 550-51, 540
N.E.2d at 217, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 141 (citation omitted). Furthermore, utilizing
the rule as formulated in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the court
of appeals found that petitioner's ordinance met the "Federal constitutional
requirements under the Renton test." Id. at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 142. Specifically, the court held that the ordinance was "an
appropriate method for addressing existing problems; it [wals not overinclusive
and it d[id] not unduly restrict adult uses to limited or unsuitable areas of the
Town." Id. at 560, 540 N.E.2d at 223, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 147-48. Moreover,
the ordinance was "'no broader than needed' for the intended purpose and
d[id] not violate the State Constitution." Id. at 560, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 148 (citations omitted).
325. Pierce Arrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88. In Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in Schad v. Mount Ephraim, he articulated the burden
which a municipality faces when exercising its zoning power to regulate
commercial speech:
[Tihe presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local
government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight
where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected
under the First Amendment. In order for a reviewing court to determine

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/31

6

et al.: Freedom of Speech and Press

956

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 12

The appropriate test for reasonable content-neutral time, place
and manner restrictions on commercial speech is similar under an
analysis of both the New York State 326 and federal
constitutions. 327 In order to hold commercial speech regulations
constitutional, four elements must be established pursuant to the
328
test set forth in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.
First, the "predominant purpose" of the ordinance must not seek
to regulate the content of the speech or expression but to regulate
the "secondary effects" of such uses on the surrounding
community. 32 9 Second, the ordinance must be designed in such a
whether a zoning restriction that impinges on free speech is 'narrowly
drawn [to] further a sufficiently substantial governmental interest,'...
the zoning authority must be prepared to articulate, and support, a
reasoned and significant basis for its decision. This burden is by no
means insurmountable, but neither should it be viewed as de minimis.
452 U.S. 61, 77 (citations omitted).
326. In Caviglia, the court noted that "[s]tate courts are bound by Supreme
Court decisions defining Federal constitutional rights but those rulings establish
a minimum standard which State courts may surpass so long as their holdings
do not conflict with Federal law." Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at
221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145. Furthermore, the court held that "New York may
interpret its own Constitution to extend greater protections to its residents." Id.
Moreover, the court recognized that "New York has a long history and
tradition of fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting
works which in other States would be found offensive to the community. Id.
(citations omitted).
327. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Cf.
Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 544, 540 N.E.2d at 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 139
(applying the Renton test to alleged violations of both Federal and New York
State constitutional claims of freedom of speech and expression).
328. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
329. See, e.g., Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 48 (finding the predominant
purpose behind the enactment of a zoning ordinance regulating the locale of
certain adult movie theaters to be the avoidance of unwanted secondary effects
by preventing "crime, protect[ing] the city's retail trade, maintain[ing]
property values, and generally 'protect[ing] and preserv[ing] the quality of [the
city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life"')
(citations omitted); Paris Adult Bookstore II, 493 U.S. at 220 (finding the
predominant purpose behind the enactment of an ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented business" to be the "eradicat[ion of] the secondary effects
of crime and urban blight"); Schad, 452 U.S. at 73 (holding that the
predominant purpose behind a zoning ordinance banning all live entertainment
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way as to serve a "substantial governmental interest." 330 Third,

the ordinance must be "narrowly tailored" to affect only those
uses that produce the unwanted secondary effects. 331 Finally, the

ordinance must allow for "reasonable alternative avenues of
communication." 332
In applying the Renton test to the case at bar, the Second
Department did not find any evidence which could establish that
the third or fourth elements of the test were satisfied. 333 The
Town did not provide any facts or supporting evidence to show
that "its ordinance was reasonably limited to those establishments
was to "avoid the problems that may be associated with live entertainment,
such as parking, trash, police protection and medical facilities"); Caviglia, 73
N.Y.2d at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 142 (finding the
"predominant purpose" behind an "adult use" zoning ordinance to be the
"eliminat[ion of] the secondary effects of adult uses and [the]
attempt[ed] ... control [of] future development in the business districts").
330. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 50 (recognizing the "city's interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect") (citations omitted); Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 553, 540 N.E.2d at
219, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (finding that the Town of Islip had a substantial
"governmental interest" in the "eradication of the effects of urban blight and
neighborhood deterioration and furtherance of the... quality of life for the
Town's residents").
331. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 52 (finding the adult use zoning
ordinance "'narrowly tailored' to affect only that category of theaters shown to
produce the unwanted secondary effects"). But see Schad, 452 U.S. at 74
(holding that a zoning ordinance which bans all live entertainment in a
commercial zone was not "narrowly drawn to respond to what might be the
distinctive problems arising from certain types of live entertainment").
332. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 50. The Court in Playtime also held
that the zoning ordinance provided reasonable alternative locations by leaving
"more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult
theater sites .... [consisting] of ample, accessible real estate, including
'acreage in all stages of development from raw land to developed, industrial,
warehouse, office, and shopping space that is criss-crossed by freeways,
highways, and roads.'" Id. at 53 (citations omitted). See also Caviglia, 73
N.Y.2d at 554-55, 540 N.E.2d at 220, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 144 (finding that the
adult use Industrial I zoning ordinance provides over 6,000 acres of land in
Industrial I for alternative locations which includes "85.6 miles of running
frontage on open roads which are situated on lots over 500 feet from a church,
park, playground or residential zone").
333. PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
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the

The court reasoned further that "the Town did

not produce proof, by testimony or affidavit, as to whether, prior
to its enactment of the ordinance in question, it had conducted
any studies,

. .

concerning the deleterious effect upon the

quality of life in its business community caused by the presence
of adult-use establishments." 335 Furthermore, the Town did not
address whether the ordinance provided reasonable alternative
locations within the town for adult-use establishments. 336 Thus,
in failing to establish the third and fourth factors, the applicable
standard of reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner
337
restrictions was not met by the Town of Huntington.
Therefore, the court held that "[u]nder these circumstances, it
cannot be said that the Town established the likelihood of its
success on the merits," inferring that the zoning ordinance as
applied to the defendants herein did not conform to the
constitutional requirements under either the Federal or State
constitutional rights for freedom of speech or expression.338

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.

337. Id. Moreover, the Town of Huntington did not address in its
application for preliminary injunctive relief whether the defendants were
entitled to a reasonable amortization period to compensate them for their
preexisting use of their property. Id. See also Village of Valatie v. Smith, 83
N.Y.2d 396, 401, 632 N.E.2d 1264, 1267, 632 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944 (1994);
Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 561, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 148 (holding

that "[p]resumptively, amortization provisions are valid unless the owner can
demonstrate that the loss suffered is so substantial that it outweighs the public
benefit gained by the exercise of the police power").
338. Pierce Arrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
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Brentrup v. Culkin
(decided November 30, 1995)

Petitioner, the children's guardian ad litem, brought a motion
seeking closure of the courtroom during a custodial
proceeding. 340 Petitioner argued that the interest and attention of
both the public and the media would be harmful and humiliating

34 1
to the children and an intrusion into the family's private life.
However, the supreme court rejected petitioner's argument,

finding that the "[c]omplete closure of the courtroom in this

matter would be neither narrowly tailored nor the least intrusive
manner in which to address the possibility of real harm to the
children." 342 In reaching its determination, the court recognized
that the right of the public and the press to attend court
proceedings is constitutionally protected under both the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution 3 4 3 and article 1,

section 8 of the New York Constitution, 344 and, therefore, such a
right will only be impinged where "there are compelling reasons
for closure."345

The courtroom proceeding at issue in this case involved the
custody of the children of the Culkin family, several of whom are

339. 635 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
340. Id. at 1018.
341. Id. at 1019.
342. Id.
343. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
344. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
345. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1017 (citing Merrick v. Merrick, 154
Misc. 2d 559, 562, 585 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1992), aff'd, 190 A.D.2d 516, 593 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1993)).
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